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Will the G20 agree to the reforms needed to make the IMF an 
effective part of international financial governance? The 
prospects are grim because it would require difficult political 
compromises or amendments to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. 
Yet reforms are needed to address the IMF’s coordination with 
other international institutions, the scope of the financial 
regulatory regime, and its representative legitimacy. This column 
some initial steps the G20 might take.  
 
The prospects of the London G20 meeting agreeing on the 
reforms needed for the IMF to operate effectively in the evolving 
international financial governance arrangements are uncertain at 
best. Some of these reforms require either difficult political 
compromises or amendments to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. 
It is therefore more realistic to hope that the G20 will launch a 
multi-stage reform process that is responsive to the key problems 
in the current governance arrangements and is based on a long-
term vision of the IMF’s role in international financial 
governance. 
The three major problems in 
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The three key problems are coordination, scope, and legitimacy. 
Coordination
Global financial governance currently involves a multiplicity of 
formally uncoordinated organisations and mechanisms. These 
include separate international bodies for banking regulators, 
capital markets, and insurance companies, the Financial Stability 
Forum, which coordinates regulators in a select group of 
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countries but has no global mandate, the IMF, which plays some 
role in overseeing some financial issues in some member states, 
the World Bank, which helps member states improve their 
financial systems, the WTO, which deals with issues relating to 
establishment of financial institutions, and the G7 and G20, 
whose efficacy is unclear (Alexander, Dhumale and Eatwell 
2006). 
Lacking an effective coordination mechanism, the international 
community resorts to ad hoc crisis-driven measures. For example, 
the IMF, in response to previous financial crises in its key 
member states, has assumed a role in the oversight of capital 
markets and national financial systems, even though it was 
designed as an international monetary institution. This approach 
is problematic from a legal and global governance perspective, 
raising concerns about the scope of the IMF’s mandate and its 
relations with its member states. 
Scope
The scope of current financial regulatory regimes is deficient in 
two ways. First, they do not cover all relevant products and 
participants. They also do not incorporate all significant issues, 
for example climate change, even though many financial 
institutions recognise it as a source of financial risk1 and the 
climate change negotiations could result in significant new 
financial flows to developing countries. 
Legitimacy
There are three aspects to the legitimacy problem. First is 
representation. This involves, in relation to the IMF, both 
ensuring that member states receive a vote that is commensurate 
with their role in global economic affairs (Rueda-Sabater, 
Ramachandran, Kraft 2009), and that those states that actually 
consume IMF services have a meaningful voice in its decision-
making bodies. A related issue is the asymmetry in the IMF’s 
relations with its members – the most powerful states in fact, but 
not in law, are less subject to its jurisdiction than weak states. 
IMF member states have already agreed on limited adjustments in 
the voting power of some members. Unfortunately, reaching this 
agreement was hard and may have consumed much of the 
available political will for dealing with this topic – despite the 
rhetoric to the contrary. 
The second aspect of the legitimacy problem is the scope of 
institutional authority. The IMF’s legal mandate has not changed 
since its creation, even though the range of its operations has. For 
example, it now deals with financial governance issues that 
involve it more deeply in the internal affairs of its member states 
than its creators envisaged. Consequently, the IMF’s mandate 
needs updating to ensure consistency with its evolving role. 
Third is accountability. As the IMF’s mission grows, it needs to 
be appropriately accountable to those member states and their 
citizens that are directly affected by its operations but have 
limited say in its governance. In addition, as its operations 
become more complex, it needs enhanced management and staff 
accountability to the Board. 
The G20 London meeting and 
IMF reform 
An IMF capable of assuming its envisaged governance roles 
needs a clear mandate, meaningful participation by all members, 
transparent operational policies and procedures, and effective 
accountability mechanisms. There are a number of actions that 
the G20 may take in London to promote this goal. 
The first is a significant increase in IMF financing through 
expansion of the New Agreement to Borrow (NAB). However, 
this action, whether or not it is based on the ambitious US 
proposal, will both mitigate and exacerbate the IMF’s legitimacy 
problems. The increase in NAB membership will give some IMF 
member states additional say in IMF operations. However, 
merely increasing the IMF’s resources and authority will 
exacerbate its accountability and scope problems. The IMF can 
offset this problem by adopting transparent operational policies 
and procedures and authorising an enhanced role for the 
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) in assessing their use. 
Additional actions will be needed to plug the gap in development 
financing. One option is for countries that have established IMF 
trust funds to agree to expand their uses. At the same time, they 
should require improved transparency and accountability in the 
IMF’s management of these trusts. Another option is a new issue 
of special drawing rights. While this idea is attractive, the 
required approval process is slow and unpredictable. 
A second likely action is agreement on merit-based selection of 
the IMF Managing Director. The significance of this change 
should not be overstated because there are many ways for 
powerful countries to ensure that “their” candidate (regardless of 
nationality) is appointed. 
Another issue that may receive attention is the representativeness 
and role of the IMF Board. Making the Board more democratic 
depends on European countries surrendering some Board seats. 
Despite their calls for greater fairness in IMF voting and 
representation, European countries are unlikely to accept this 
change without some compensation. Thus, absent some “grand 
bargain” it is unlikely that the political will to reform either the 
Board or IMF voting exists. 
This issue should be considered in conjunction with the proposal 
to create the “Council” to replace the IFMC. This Council, 
anticipated in Schedule D of the IMF Articles, would have the 
same composition and voting arrangements as the Board. 
Consequently, it would not resolve the IMF’s representational 
problems and would merely replace an advisory body with a 
decision-making body. 
The debate over the Board’s role is whether or not it should 
surrender its operational responsibilities and concentrate on 
strategic issues. This reformed Board could meet less frequently 
and its Directors need not be based in Washington. This would 
result in the management and staff having greater operational 
responsibilities, thereby underscoring the internal accountability 
problem at the IMF. This could be addressed by both improving 
the IMF’s operational policies and procedures and expanding the 
responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Office. 
The London meeting can initiate but not conclude consideration
of reforms in the IMF’s oversight, coordination, enforcement and 
advisory functions. The IMF already performs versions of these 
functions in its consumer member states but not in its richer 
member states. Without addressing this asymmetry, the IMF will 
not have the credibility to be a fair coordinator of international 
financial governance arrangements. 
In addition, the IMF cannot effectively perform these functions 
unless it has the legal authority to address the full scope of 
international financial governance issues. This requires amending 
its Articles because some issues are outside its current mandate. 
Given that amending the Articles involves the same ratification 
process as approving a new treaty, might the international 
community be better served by creating a new institution that 
better reflects current geopolitical realities and international 
financial needs than to reform an organisation that has serious 
legitimacy and legacy problems? 
Conclusion 
The world needs the IMF. But, it also needs an organisation that 
does not have the scope, function, and legitimacy problems that 
plague the IMF. While resolving these issues is a long-term 
process, the G20 can begin by increasing the IMF’s resources, 
enhancing its accountability to all its internal and external 
stakeholders, and making its operational policies and procedures 
more transparent. 
Footnote 
1 See, for example, www.equator-principles.com
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